This is an informal report intended primarily for internal or limited
Another concern is how much other portions of the facility outside the firing chamber must be hardened to ensure personnel protection in the event of an accidental detonation while the chamber door is open.
To assess these concerns, a 1/4-scale replica model of the planned contained firing chamber was engineered, constructed, and tested with scaled explosive charges ranging from 25 to 125% of the operational explosives limit of 60 kg. From 16 detonations of high explosives, 880 resulting strains, blast pressures, and temperatures within the model were measured to provide information for the final design.
The major design consideration of such a chamber is its overall structural dynamic response in terms
Executive Summary
Based on measurements obtained from scaled detonation experiments within a 1/4scale replica model, factors of safety for dynamic yield of the fixing chamber structure were calculated and compared to the design criterion of totally elastic response. The rectangular, reinforced-concrete chamber model exhibited a lightly damped vibrational response that placed the structure in alternating cycles of tension and compression. During compression, both the reinforcing steel and the concrete remained elastic. During tension, the reinforcing steel remained elastic, but the concrete elastic limit was exceeded in two areas, the center spans of the ceiling and the north wall, where elastic safety factors as low as 0.66 were obtained, thus indicating that the concrete would be expected to crack in those areas. Indeed, visual posttest inspection of those areas revealed tight cracks in the concrete.
Internal blast pressures averaged 2 to 3 times greater than expected. Quasistatic gas pressures peaked at 18 psig, roughly 86% of the 21 psig predicted by calculation.
External blast overpressures from an accidental detonation scenario ranging from 0.1 to 70 psig were measured during the open-door tests at 22 locations outside the firing chamber model.
In general, these experiments have demonstrated that a rectangular, conventionally reinforced, concrete structure can be used as a firing chamber. More specifically, they have validated the conceptual design prepared by the architectural/engineering firm of Holmes and Narver. In anticipation of stricter environmental regulations and because of the Secretary of Energy's mandate that environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) concerns be the first priority at all
Rationale for Contained Firing

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities,
LLNL is developing a comprehensive, state-ofthe-art, blast-effects containment (or containedfiring) facility (CFF) (see Fig. 1 ). This is needed to reduce emissions of hazardous materials and the amount of contaminated wastes generated by explosives testing while providing a continuing capability to test nuclear and other assemblies that contain high explosives. A permanent, stateof-the-art firing chamber is to be constructed around and integrated into an existing facility's open-air firing surface to completely contain blast effects and thereby enhance environmental protection, waste minimization, and safety for the 21st century.1
CFF Description
The CFF project consists of adding about 2463 m2 of structural additions to the existing ~pen-~air firing facility at Bunker 801, the site of LLNL's existing world-class 17-MeV flash x-ray @XR) machine. Bunker 801 already contains a variety of high-speed optical and electronic diagnostic equipment, which, together with the FXR, provide unique diagnostic capability. The new additians consist of four components: a firing chamber, a support area, a diagnostic equipment area, and an office/conference module, as shown in Fig. 2 . The heart of the CFF is the firing chamber (see Fig. 3 ) . Slightly larger than half a gymnasium, the firing chamber will contain the blast overpressure and fragmentation effects from detonations of cased explosive charges up to 60 kg. The interior surfaces of the firing chamber from highvelocity fragments. A key aspect of the CFF is that the rectangular concrete firing chamber will be made with low-cost, conventional reinforcement, as opposed to the labor-intensive, laced reinforcement commonly found in many blastresistant structures. From a materials standpoint, a spherical chamber shape would be more blast efficient, but a slightly heavier, rectangular shape is cheaper, provides easier and more desirable setup and working surfaces, and encompasses existing diagnostic systems. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls, ceiling, and floor of the chamber are 1.22,1.37, and 1.83 m, respectively. The locations of existing camera ports and the end of the FXR accelerator (see Fig. 31 , all of which must be in the chamber, led to the selection of a chamber area of about 344 m*, with an interior height of 9.5 m.
staging place for preparing the nonexplosive components of an experiment, equipment and materials storage, personnel locker rooms, rest rooms, and decontamination showers. It also houses the filters, scrubbers, and a temporary waste-accumulation area for the waste products from testing.
The diagnostic equipment area (about 576 m2) wiJl accommodate multiple-beam optical equipment to measure, through 12 horizontal optical lines of sight (LOSS) into the firing chamber, velocity-time histories from as many as 40 points on an explosively d r i v e metal surface. These are in addition to 11 vertical optical LOSS from the existing camera room situated below the chamber floor. The diagnostics area is similar in construction to the support area and will also protect personnel who may occupy it during explosives tests.
The support area (about 1543 m2) provides a
Design Equivalency Criteria
The criterion for the design of the CFF is that it be able to elastically Survive the blast effects from detonating up to 60 kg of an energetic explosive such as PBX-9404. Designing the chamber to survive this environment requires an equivalency conversion in the structural design process from energetic material to the de facto standard (TNT). The equivalent TNT mass is based on a single-worst-case equivalency factor that encompasses all maximum effects from blast and quasistatic gas pressure (currently used at .
Site 300). This factor (p) is defined as the largest ratio of the heat of detonation for energetic materials to that of " F Due to variations in high-explosive charge initiation and the inaccuracies associated with construction materials, a safety factor of 1.2 is additionally specified3 in the design equivalency process. The amount of TNT equivalent for struaual design purposes is thus given by
For the CFF, this amounts to Mass of TNT design equivalent = 1.3 -1.2 -60 kg = 93.6 kg , (3) which is the basis of all the design calculations by the architect/engineer (A/E).
Environmental Considerations
"Contained firing" implies complete containment.of all blast effects associated with the detonation of cased high-explosive materials. This includes discharges to the environment in the form of noxious gases, particulate matter (aerosolized and chunky), and impulsive noise produced from the detonation. Although it is highly desirable to have a "zero discharge" criterion as a goal of the CFF project, it is recognized that this is nearly impossible to achieve and is excessively expensive to implement. Instead, the CFF project is based on a "near-zero discharge" policy, whereby small discharges that are within all environmental regulations may o c w from time to time over the anticipated life of the facility. The distinction between the two is important socially and politically, in that small, environmentally acceptable, accidental discharges may result in closure of the facility if they are not anticipated and publicly acknowledged early in the design process.
that will contain not only very high-amplitude, short-duration impulsive shock pressures but
The firing chamber will be a sealed structure also the much lower amplitude and longer duration quasistatic gas pressures that are typical of explosives detonated in closed firing chambers. Anchored to the inside of the concrete chamber surfaces is a thin, continuous, 12.7-mthick, mild-steel pressure liner, which will seal and prevent the detonation gases from passing through the concrete walls, ceiling, and floor, all of which may develop structurally acceptable hairline cracks as the facility ages. All doors, optical LOSS, and other intrusions into the firing chamber (such as the FXR bullnose) will have seals that allow the firing chamber to function as a pressure vessel to contain the blast and quasistatic pressure. After the gases cool, blast dampers will open, and ventilation fans will purge the chamber with fresh air. The exhaust gases will be processed through HEPA (highefficiency particulate air) filters and scrubbers before being released to the environment. Slight negative atmospheric pressures will be maintained afterward in the firing chamber and the support area to reduce the escape of unprocessed airborne hazardous particulates and gases to the environment.
Solid wastes and shot-related debris will be greatly diminished and can be collected and disposed of as low-level radiated waste or as mixed waste. In conjunction with management of these solid wastes, a reactive-waste certification program is being developed at LLNL. An internal, closed, water wash-down system is planned that will recirculate water spray within the chamber and filter out dust and particulates in the form of sludge. The CFF project will aggressively minimize waste by reducing the total solid waste to about one-tenth of the amount generated today.
Blast-Eff ects Supplemental Testing
After review of the CFF conceptual design report (CDR)? four critical blast-effects design issues were identified that, due to their variability, would benefit from further investigation. A four-part program, primarily based on blast effects testing, was formulated in each of the following four areas:
Shrapnel mitigation Close-in shock loading Qualification and acceptance testing Total structural response.
The focus of this report is the total structural response obtained by testing a 1 /4scale model of the firing chamber. The rationale for each of the other three testing programs is described briefly in the following sections.
S*apnel Mitigation
High-velocity fragments from cased explosives could do significant damage to the pressure liner in the firing chamber and thereby compromise the containment and sealing of hazardous -gases and particulates. Worst-case, shrapnelproducing experiments at Site 300 were monitored and documented5 to evaluate various general-purpose shrapnel-protection schemes.
The resulting design, shown in Fig. 4 , is a replaceable, general-purpose, multilayer, protection scheme to be installed on the inside concrete surfaces of the firing chamber. From this testing program, three important design modifications to the conceptual design could be realized Additional local shielding would be required on an as-needed basis near those experiments that produce material with a directional nature (e.g., shaped charges). Addition of localized shielding would permit the overall general-purpose shielding to be thinner, resulting in a cost saving.
General-purpose shielding made from mild steel instead of armor plate would be used because mild steel is roughly half the cost and provides about 85% of the penetration resistance of armor plate. Multilayer technology would be used, whereby thinner shrapnel-mitigation plates are separated by air spaces, thereby permitting the total thickness of shielding to be reduced and facilitating replacement and repair.
Close-in Shock Loading
The highest unit shock (blast) loading that the CFF must withstand wiU occur on the floor just below the 60-kg explosive charge location. Currently due to diagnostic requirements of the FXR and the desired operational optical LOSS, this distance is 1.22 m. This results in an extremely close-in (Z = 0.66 ft/lb1I3) blast loading on the reinforced concrete floor of the chamber. Historically floor damage from close-in loading has been a common problem for many blast chambers within the DOE/DoD Department of Defense). Given this, the close-in blast loading on the chamber floor is considered to be one of the critical design issues for the proposed CFF. To investigate this concern, a series of 19 close-in blast loading experiments was conducted on a 1/4scale section of the proposed floor design (see Fig. 5 ). The following conclusions were reached as a result of this testing6 a Tensile strains in the concrete were 10 times the allowable dynamic tensile yield and would be likely to cause severe concrete cracking and pulverizing in the long term.
developed and tested that reduced the measured strains in the concrete to acceptable elastic levels to prevent severe pulverizing of the concrete. bolts, and the anvil were all within elastic limits for steel.
A low-cost blast attenuation system was 0 Measured strains in the reinforcement, the Figure 5 . U4-scale floor section prior to testing at the 25% explosive weight level.
Qualification and Acceptance Testing
After the CFF is constructed but before it is used for normal experiments, a series of qualification/acceptance tests will be performed in the firing chamber to test it and the support systems.
Explosives tests that produce up to 125% of the chamber pressure capacity are required by LLNL policy7 to further ensure that the facility has been safety constructed and that it meets or exceeds the original design criterion of totally elastic response. As with the 1 /4scale model of the firing chamber, the actual firing chamber will be instrumented with permanent gauging to assess the effects of the required qualification tests. The permanent strain gauges and pressure transducers can then be monitored at any time during detonations over the anticipated life of the firing chamber to ensure safe and reliable operation.
The remainder of this report describes 16 blast tests conducted in a quarter-scale model of the preliminary or conceptual chamber design.
Total. Structural Response Experiments-Firing Chamber Scale Model Introduction
It is customary and good engineering practice to build and test scale models of highvalue, blast-resistant structures before the actual full-size structures are constructed. Testing of an instrumented scale model is particularly useful in verifying the preliminary design because it reveals potential construction defects and provides the best estimate of the actual blast loading environment for use in the final design. Recent experience from qualification testing of the contained firing vessels in the HighExplosives Applications Facility at the LLNL main site indicates that, in some regions, the highest measured strains occur after the shock loading has passed and are due primarily to the vibrational modes of the strudure that are excited by the impulsive nature of the detonation.
To evaluate the CDR chamber design, a 1/4scale replica model of the firing chamber was engineered, constructed, and instrumented with strain gauges, pressure transducers, and temperature gauges (see Fig. 6 ).
Closed-and open-door tests were conducted by detonating high-explosive charges within the model. For the closed-door tests, the chamber was sealed to measure the normal maximum interior pressures, strains, and temperatures that would be expected on a routine, day-to-day basis (100%) and from qualification/ acceptance over-tests at 125%. As a result of confinement, realistic blast loadings with multiple reflections off of the ceiling and walls occurred, as did long-term quasistatic gas loadings. some experiments permitted outside blast pressures to be measured that could affect adjacent structures in the event that an accidental detonation occurs while a shot is being set up in the firing chamber. These blast measurements were used by the CFF A/E to assess and design adequate facility hardening (i.e., protection for those personnel who would not be directly involved in the pending explosive experiment, especially personnel in the locker room, the clean diagnostics area, and the small office/conference area).
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Leaving the chamber door open during
Design Considerations
A scale factor of 1/4 was chosen as a compromise between modeling scalability, cost, and internal accessibility. Since the rationale for testing was to verify that the overall or global response was within limits, nonessential design details and features specified in the CDR intentionally were left out of the scale model to keep the cost reasonable and the model simple.
ments that made the model stronger or easier to build. It was further recognized that the CDR In some cases, the deviations were improve-.
was, by nature, a preliminary design and was not intended to be a complete design. Therefore, some design details were based on established civil engineering practice and code regulations. The major additions and/or deviations from the CDR and the rationale for making them were as follows:
Substituted single-level floor. The CDR called for a split-level floor that would be integrated with the existing camera room roof. The effect of the split level with intermediate support would have been a stronger and much more expensive scale model to construct. Instead, a single slab floor was constructed that, due to its longer span, would be weaker and thus would provide a more conservative verification of the conceptual design.
Exact replica (or geometric) scaling of the steel reinforcing bars (rebar) could not be achieved by using conventional common sizes. Instead, equivalent scaling was used by adjusting the inplane rebar spacing and size to try to maintain the CDR ratio of rebar to concrete. A comparison of the flexural reinforcement between the CDR and the 1/4scale model is provided in Table 1 .
Simplified wall-to-floor joint. The CDR called for a notch or keyway in the concrete floor into which the walls would be tied and poured. Instead, upon advice from OUT civil engineers, this keyway joint was eliminated in favor of a simple, flush, butting connection between the floor and walls. As a result, the moment resistance of this joint would not be compromised and, for the purposes of our testing, the sealing capability would not be affected either. Thk again simplified the model design and reduced construction costs.
Used equivalent replica scaled rebar. Eliminated diagnostic viewpork. Details for optical.port designs were not included in the CDR. Additionally because the ports were so much smaller than the firing chamber, it was thought that the stress concentrations around the ports would be very limited and localized. Simple pipe-and-flange ports were added to the model to facilitate flush-mounting the internal blast-pressure transducers on the inside surfaces of the chamber. These were typically ports with a 2-in. clear aperture but with steel blank flanges mounted instead of port glass. A large, 12-in., clear-aperture port was added for future experiments to help assess double-port glass-mounting schemes developed in HEAF. The 12-in. port was sealed off during testing with blank steel flanges.
Two 6-in. ports also were added in the roof at the northeast comer and in the south wall near the floor at the east wall comer. The 6-in. roof port was valved to allow the chamber to vent quasistatic pressure before reentry. The 6-in. wall port was fitted with a feedthrough to hold the detonator wires for firing the shots. The ports were located diagonally opposite each other for future experiments involving gases other than air to reduce the blast effects.
shrapnel-protection plates. Due to their low relative mass compared to the thick walls'of the chamber, it was assumed that the shrapnel protection system and pressure h e r would have a neglible effect on the overall dynamic structural response of the chamber. However, an area of concern is the rebounding of the pressure liner, which is anchored to the walls. The mass of the pressure liner and bolted-on shrapnel-protection plates produce sigruficant inertial forces that have to be reacted through the anchors when the Reduced coverage of general-purpose walls resonate due to the blast. To investigate this behavior and keep the construction costs reasonable, a 0.92-by 0.92-m section of the pressure liner and general-purpose shrapnel-protection system was added to the north wall of the model. The shrapnel-protection system was located at the center span of the wall, where it was expected to encounter the greatest rebound acceleration.
' 0
Simplified blast /equipment access door. Since the CDR did not contain details of the large 3.6-by 4.3-m blast door and framework, a simple two-plate door system was used for personnel access and containment of the expected internal quasistatic pressure.
( 8 Eliminated nonstructural features, such as the water.wash-down and associated floordrainage systems, the ventilation system, utilities such as electricity and gas, and personnel-safety systems.
91 Used unscaled concrete aggregate. No attempt was made to scale the concrete aggregate for the scale model because it is believed to have little or no impact on the dynamic response of the firing chamber. The aggregate size was reduced from that in the CDR (3/4 in. ma.) to 3/8 in. for ease of installation, especially at the comers and other areas that were highly congested with rebar. The overall concrete compressive strength remained the same (6 ksi nominal). Concrete with a minimum compressive strength of 6000 psi was used per the CDR. For better placement, a plasticizer was added per the manufacturer's specifications. Cylinder test datal1 showed the strength to be an average of 6050 psi at 28 days for the floor and 6200 psi for the rest of the chamber. Both pours were given a full, 10-day water cure.
Construction
The flexural steel reinforcing consisted of conventional grade 60 rebar tied in two parallel mats. The spacing between the floor, ceiling, and wall mats was nominally set to 15,8.5, and 7.5 in., respectively. Table 1 lists the flexural reinforcing used to construct the model.
The steel shear reinforcing used was #3, grade 60 rebar on 6-in. centers throughout the chamber.
7.543 x 7-ft x 1.5-in. mild-steel plate was inset and flush-mounted with the top surface of the floor. After both concrete pours had cured, highstrength expansive grout12 was pumped through special access holes in the anvil to eliminate voids and improve the contact between the bottom of the anvil and the concrete. The holes were then sealed with standard pipe plugs. After the grout To model the 6-in.-thick shot anvil, a single A 3-ft x 3-ft square section of the pressure liner and general-purpose shrapnel-protection system was added to the inside surface on the north wall of the 1/4-scale model (see Fig. 10 ). The general-purpose shrapnel-protection system was a three-layer design-a thin pressure liner followed by two layers of shrapnel protection plates. The 1/8-in.-thick pressure liner had l/&in.-diameter by 4.25-in.-long J hooks welded to its backside on 6-in. centers. These hooks were fully embedded in the concrete during construction to provide good contact between the pressure liner and the concrete surface. On the front surface of the liner, 1-in.-diameter bosses were welded to support the shrapnel-protection plates. Two layers of 12-x 12-x 0.25-in. mild-steel plates were then bolted to the liner using 1 /&in. studs and nuts. The plate edges were staggered between layers and were supported to give a 1/2-in. air gap between layers. Due to the staggering, 1 /4 and 1 /2 plate sections were used at the edges of the grid to provide the full dynamic mass from a rebound/pullout-resistance standpoint. For each full-size plate, five studs were used. The shrapnel plates were precoated with various high-temperature coatings to evaluate their ease of cleaning and durability from the effects of the explosive fireball.
A single 2.34 x 2.75-ft x 2-in. steel plate hinged on a steel framework was used to seal the bullnose opening f;om the inside of the chamber.
The frame, which was welded from &in. x 1/2-in.
angle, was cast or embedded into the concrete adjacent to the sealing plate. Figure 7 shows this embedment early in the construction process. A simple pipe hinge was constructed between the frame and the sealing plate so that the sealing plate would act as a bullnose door. Six 1-in. x 23-in.-long bolts were passed through the frame from the outside of the chamber into tapped holes in the back sMace of the sealing plate to close off the bullnose opening. Figure 11 shows the 1/4scale chamber model after the forms were removed. 
Experimental Setup
Sixteen blast tests using 0.3 lb (25%) to 2.58 lb (125%) of C4 explosive were performed within the instrumented 1 /4-scale chamber model. The charges were all spherical, double, center-detonated, bare high explosive. C4 explosive was used because it was readily available and closely matched the heat of detonation of the operational-limit explosive PBX-9404. For each test, the charge was supported from ceiling hooks by lightweight strings such that the center of the charge was 12 in. above the top surface of the shot anvil. In the 1 /4-scale model, the 12-in. elevation represented the FXR beam centerhe, where most of the experiments would be conducted. Only two charge locations were used, but they were selected to provide the worst-case loading on the 1/4-scale structure. The first and largest charge location was in CDR Zone 1 near the center of the anvil (see Fig. 12 ). This represented the maximum operational charge limit of 60 kg of PBX-9404 and thus provided the worst-case global loading on the structure. The second location, with smaller charge amounts, was in CDRZone 4 near the bullnose (see Fig. 13 ). This simulated close-in, highly localized loading on the bullnose. Table 2 shows the test matrix.
Closed-door tests were performed at four scaled levels (25%, 50%, loo%, and 125%) of the CFF operational explosive mass limit of 60 kg of PBX-9404. The 125% shots were performed to simulate firing chamber overtesting, as required by Laboratory policy.
Since personnel would not be present in the adjacent parts of the CFF during the qualification testing, the worst-case scenario for an accidental detonation with the door open would be at the normal operational (100%) explosive mass limit. Access to the interior of the chamber to set up the charges was gained through a 3-x 3.54 opening that represented the large CFF 12-x 14-ft equipment access door. Since the 1/4-scale model did not contain a built-in ventilation system or any personnel safety system monitors, the model was treated as a confined area. Therefore, portable oxygen sensors were used by shot personnel before entry to verify that sufficient oxygen was present. After each test was fired and the For a replica scale model, the amount of Tables A3 and A4 . Material properties listed in Table 4 were used to calculate the maximum stresses from the measured rnaximm strains. To access and evaluate the original nonyielding criteria, safety factors for tensile and compressive dynamic yielding based on the Table 4 properties were calculated and are listed in Tables A5 andA6. Safety factors less than 1 indicate yielding and are shown in bold for graphical comparison.
Peak external blast pressures from the opendoor tests are summarized in Fig. 18 . Peak internal blast pressures from each data record are tabulated in Table 5 . Typical internal blast pressure traces recorded from the 100% charge levels for the bullnose and the south wall are shown in Figs. 19 and 20, respectively. and corresponding average air temperature from a 125% over-test in Zone 1. While it was intended to measure only the quasistatic gas pressure, the pressure transducer also was exposed to the more impulsive high-pressure shock waves. This is believed to have excited an internal resonance within the transducer that produced a false overshoot and ringing for the first 10 seconds. The trace in Fig. 21a has been filtered to remove erroneous ringing and overshoot. Table A6 ), no problem is apparent in the steel reinforcement or the concrete as long as the members are in compression. Safety factors calculated from the 100% and 125% testing levels range from 2.6 to 647, the worst case (SF = 2.6) being in the concrete at the center of the ceiling near the inner reinforcing mat (C12).
2. Based on the safety factors for dynamic tensik yield, no problem is apparent in the steel reinforcement. However, at seven distinct gauge locations within the concrete, the safety factors for dynamic tensile yielding were less than 1.0. This is particularly evident in the data for the 100% and 125% testing levels in Table A5 . The implication is that blast-induced cracking of the concrete is likely to initiate in these areas. The areas of concern are the center spans of the north wall and ceiling. Because the firing chamber is symmetrical, the following observations for the north wall also would apply to the south wall.
Specifically, at 100% and 125%, the vertical strain in the north wall outer concrete center span (C7) exceeded dynamic yield four out of six times, giving consistently low safety factors (0.86 to 0.66). For only one experiment out of six did the inner concrete gauge in this same area produce an unacceptable SF of 0.96. In the horizontal direction (east-west), the inner concrete gauge (C14) indicated yielding (SF = 0.93, 0.80) and only for the two Zone-1 experiments at the 100% level. At the 125% level, the safety factors for gauge C14 increased to 1.81 and 1.69 for Zone 1. appears to be at the expense of the inner concrete (C12) safety factors, which then deceased to 0.95 and 0.88. From these observations, it is assmied that cracking of the concrete in the ceiling initiated at the outer surface an'd eventually advanced through the ceiling to the inner surface. To enhance the visual effects of the cracks, the concrete was moistened and photographed during different stages of drying before the 125% shot level. Figures 22-24 show typical cracks from the dynamic response of the firing chamber.
3.
Low safety factors for dynamic tensile yielding (SF = 0.71,0.72) also were recorded on gauge C6, located in the concrete near the corners of the door frame during tests 9 and 15. This observation is assumed to be less important, inasmuch as the details for the extra reinforcement in this region were not fully specified in the CDR, and high localized strains were expected.
4.
At the 50% shot level, low tensile safety factors for dynamic yielding (SF = 0.91,0.97) were recorded in the bottom of the concrete floor. This was consistent with the results from previous testing.13 When a previously developed blastattenuation system was used for the remaining 10 experiments above the 50% level,.the lowest factor of safety was 2.08 for the 125% level. Figure 25 shows the floor blast attenuation system in place.
5. Based on the measured strain in a single anvil hold-down bolt in Zone 1 (gauge %1), it is recommended that the number of anvil holddown bolts be increased. It appears that significant rebounding of the a n d OCCLUS, which induces very high tensile forces and yielding in the hold-down bolts. Tensile safety factors as low as 0.27 were measured at the 100% level. Additionally, by adding more bolts and thus decreasing the spacing between bolts, the tensile rebound forces are expected to be spread out more uniformly within the concrete below the anvil.
The transfer of these tensile rebound forces into the concrete through an insufficient number of anchor bolts is speculated to cause highly localized yielding, leading to through-thickness cracking, as observed during the floor section testing.13 6. As expected from cracked section concrete design, it appears that tensile yielding (i.e., cracking) of the concrete increases the damping of the vibrational response of the structure. This can be seen by examining Fig. 26 , which gives a chronological history of the strain in the concrete of the north wall (gauge C7) prior to and during yielding. This figure also gives evidence of strain relaxation and redistribution by the reduction in the peak strain value from (a) to (b) . It is not clear that this cracked section behavior is desirable from a repeated use standpoint, in that it may not be compatible with the original design criteria of an infinite-life elastic response. Clearly the long-term behavior after cracking has not been tested in these experiments, and further study is recommended.
applied to the nine mild-steel shrapnel-protection plates mounted within the north inside wall of the chamber. Table 6 lists these coatings by surface preparation and manufacturer's name. These coatings, which were all at a scaled distance of approximatley 4.5 f t /~P~ from a charge in Zone 1, performed equally well and did not show any signs of buming from the detonation fireball.
the inside surface of the bullnose door, which was located at a scaled distance of 0.73 ft/lb1/3 7. Various high-temperature coatings were High-temperature paint was also applied to 23 from Zone 4. Because it was close to the charge, the paint showed some signs of ablation and burning.
8. Unexpectedly about half of the steel rebar strain gauges failed just before and just as testing started. Although this was unfortunate, we overcame this condition by replacing strain gauges during mid-testing and successfully obtained rebar strain at important points (see Fig. 27 ). Since similar strain gauges are planned to be used in the full-size chamber to monitor its dynamic response over its lifetime, it is recommended that these failures be investigated to determine the exact cause so that they may be prevented in the future. * 9. The measured peak internal blast pressures were compared with those calculated by using the SHOCKT4 computer program at the 100% shot level for detonations in Zones 1 and 4. The SHOCK computer program was the program used in the CDR to calculate the load pressures and impulses for the design of the chamber. For comparison, Table 7 compares measured and predicted. For close-in loading at scaled distances less than 1.0 ft~lb'/~, the measurements are close to those predicted (-85%). In the far 
SHOCK. The most likely explanation for this
large cliscrepancy is the use of eledriaan's tape over the face of the pressure sensing diaphragm to eliminate the temperature effects from the fireball. In doing so, the presence of the tape may have mass-loaded the sensor and thus changed its effective calibration.
10. Figure 28 shows a reasonable correlation of the peak values for measured quasistatic pressure and temperature as a function of charge weight. As expected, the quasistatic pressure is due to the hot products of combustion and it decreases at the same rate as the gases cool (see Fig. 21 ).
11. The quasistatic gas pressure measured during the experiments tracked the predicted pressures fairly well. Figure 29 is a plot of the peak values of the quasistatic pressures as a function of the charge weights used. At the 125% shot level, the measured pressure was 18 psig vs 21 psig calculated via the Weibell formula. Table A1 Maximum tensile strains Table A2 Maximum compressive strains Table A3 Maximum tensile stresses Table A4 Maximum compressive stresses Table A5  Table A6 Maximum tensile safety'factors to yield Maximum compressive safety factors to yield 
